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Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy 
Why Accommodate? 
Reflections on the Gay Marriage Culture Wars 
Maggie Gallagher∗ 
If gay marriage is a constitutional right, a moral good, a basic norm of 
democratic equality, then why accommodate opposing views? 
Why should anyone who believes in gay marriage also support conscience 
protections for individuals or organizations opposed to gay marriage? 
¶1 The questions posed above are foundational; the answers to each dictate (in 
practice) the policy options one is willing to consider in regard to gay marriage, 
particularly in terms of accommodations.  Technical difficulties of legal drafting aside, 
the reasons underlying one’s willingness to consider religious accommodations in the 
area of gay marriage will dictate the breadth and kind of religious liberty legislation we 
will be willing to consider.  Carefully exploring the core question—Why 
accommodate?—will enable us to conceptualize why accommodation on this issue is so 
difficult, and, particularly, why it is so conceptually difficult for gay marriage advocates 
to tolerate the idea of substantial religious accommodations. 
¶2 This Article proposes four potential reasons why citizens, legislators, and/or judges 
who endorse gay marriage should consider accommodating the views of traditional faith 
communities: practical, civic, moral sympathy, and principle.  I argue (perhaps counter-
intuitively) that the most urgent need, if we are to reduce the conflict between gay rights 
and religious liberty, is not merely to argue from principle alone, but also to develop 
respect for the other reasons for accommodation: practical, civic, and moral sympathy. 
I. WHY ACCOMMODATE?  FOUR REASONS 
¶3 Below is a typology of four reasons why gay marriage advocates should support 
religious liberty accommodations for those opposed to gay marriage.  
A. Practical 
¶4 This is the simplest reason for accommodation to secure political support for gay 
marriage.  To enact gay marriage laws, proponents of gay marriage believe they have to 
allay concerns of voters they disagree with by providing religious liberty 
accommodations.  The narrowness of religious liberty exemptions typically offered by 
gay marriage advocates strongly suggests that, at present, allaying voter concerns, not 
                                                 
∗ Chairman of the Board, National Organization for Marriage and President, Institute for Marriage and 
Public Policy. 
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creating robust accommodations, is the primary motivation for inclusion of such 
exemptions in gay marriage legislation.1  
B. Civic 
¶5 Large moral conflicts are hard on the fabric of society, especially church-state 
conflicts.  Tolerance is not just a matter of legal rights but also of civic culture (defined as 
the ways we relate to one another in the absence of legal compulsion).  When large blocs 
in the population disagree on basic moral issues, we as a society look for ways to reduce 
the tangible expression of these conflicts in order to promote the common good.  
President Bill Clinton’s rule of “maximum feasible accommodation” of religion in the 
1990s was one public expression of this view.2  
C. Moral Sympathy 
¶6 If gay marriage is, as David Blankenhorn has written, a “conflict of goods,”3 then 
even those who judge the balance to be in favor of gay marriage might wish to express 
respect for the views of those with whom they disagree.  (Just as even strong marriage 
advocates like Blankenhorn may be motivated to seek alternative ways to accommodate 
gay couples’ needs.4)   
¶7 Even in the midst of strong moral disagreement, people can often see and 
acknowledge some value in the position they oppose.  Consider the thorny issue of 
abortion.  Some abortion-rights advocates can respect a consistent pro-life position.5  
Though they believe women have the legal right to terminate a pregnancy, they do not 
                                                 
1 A number of statutory exemptions cover only situations already protected by law, specifically, the 
extremely slight possibility that clergy will be forced to officiate in weddings of which their denomination 
disapproves.  For instance, Vermont’s same-sex marriage law provides that it “does not require a member 
of the clergy authorized to solemnize a marriage . . . to solemnize any marriage, and any refusal to do so 
shall not create any civil claim or cause of action.”  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5144(b) (2009); see also 
Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 2009, D.C. CODE § 46-406 (2009); B. 
A07732 § 4, 2009–2010 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009).  Other exemptions merely restate existing 
constitutional guarantees.  For instance, Maine’s same-sex marriage law, recently repealed by referendum 
in a people’s veto, expressly “does not authorize any court or other state or local governmental body, entity, 
agency or commission to compel, prevent or interfere in any way with any religious institution’s religious 
doctrine, policy, teaching, or solemnization of marriage within that particular religious faith’s tradition as 
guaranteed by the Maine Constitution, Article 1, Section 3 or the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.”  An Act to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650 (repealed 2009). 
2 This view was first articulated by William A. Galston, a domestic policy advisor to President Clinton, and 
now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.  See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, THE PRACTICE OF LIBERAL 
PLURALISM 167 (2005); WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES AND DIVERSITY IN 
THE LIBERAL STATE 295 (1991).  Briefly, this view suggests that the state should allow as much 
accommodation of religious belief and practice as possible, bounded only by the need for basic social 
cohesion.  
3 DAVID BLANKENHORN, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 171 (2007). 
4 See David Blankenhorn & Jonathan Rauch, A Reconciliation on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 
2009, at WK11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/22/opinion/22rauch.html (calling for legal 
recognition of civil unions). 
5 See Emily Heroy, Dear Pro-Life Movement: I Respect Your Opinion.  Can You Respect Mine?  From 
Someone Who Believes in Pro-Choice (Jan. 22, 2010), http://genderacrossborders.com/2010/01/22/dear-
pro-life-movement-i-respect-your-opinion-can-you-respect-mine-from-someone-who-believes-in-pro-
choice/. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  L A W  A N D  S O C I A L  PO L I C Y  [ 2 0 1 0  
 
262 
want to live in a society that really sees abortion as morally inconsequential, like clipping 
off a fingernail or taking out an appendix.6  These abortion rights advocates may believe 
that strong pro-life advocates should be given legal protections and accommodations,7 
because they provide a counterbalance to treating abortion as morally insignificant.8 
¶8 Pacifism is another example of a moral position with which most people do not 
agree, but which can nonetheless generate substantial respect that leads to a desire for 
conscience protections.  By adopting the strongest and most consistent view—that killing 
is always wrong—pacifists do a moral service to the rest of us, forcing us to justify our 
own views and reminding us of the gravity of the act of killing (whether the soldier in 
war, or the murderer at home) even when we disagree with pacifism.9 
D. Principle 
¶9 By principle, I mean the belief that advocates of traditional marriage have a right to 
their views and lifestyles, which the law is obligated to respect.  In general, there are 
three overlapping but conceptually distinct ways of conceptualizing the principle being 
protected: respect for religion as a right, respect for liberty generally as a right,10 and 
respect for conscience per se.  The difference, then, between the first three reasons for 
religious accommodations described above and this final reason of principle, is that 
principle obligates.  The first three reasons to accommodate are in some sense optional—
they depend on charity and prudence, not duty; they are gifts, not rights.  Most people in 
favor of some value prefer obligation to choice.   
¶10 To further distinguish myself from a legal scholar in this Article, I would like to 
make the case that the most urgent need in allaying conflicts between gay marriage and 
religious liberty is to develop arguments for accommodation stressing these center two 
categories: the civic argument and moral sympathy.  The key problem we now face 
sociologically, politically, and intellectually lies in the relative paucity in the 
development of these kinds of arguments.  
                                                 
6 Cf. Naomi Wolf, Our Bodies, Our Souls, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 16, 1995, at 26 (“I still maintain that 
we need to contextualize the fight to defend abortion rights within a moral framework that admits that the 
death of a fetus is a real death; that there are degrees of culpability, judgment and responsibility involved in 
the decision to abort a pregnancy.”). 
7 This includes laws allowing medical professionals not to participate in abortions where doing so would 
violate their beliefs or laws preventing public funding of abortion so that taxpayers do not have to subsidize 
a procedure they find abhorrent.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (2010) (prohibiting certain federally-funded 
organizations from discriminating against health care professionals who refuse for religious or moral 
reasons to participate in abortions); GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE FUNDING OF ABORTION UNDER 
MEDICAID (2010), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SFAM.pdf. 
8 See Wolf, supra note 6.  
9 See Jeff McMahan, The Pacifist Challenge 7 (May 18, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/2nd_annual_online_philoso/files/jeff_mcmahan.pdf) (“I also 
now accept that a certain version of pacifism has much to be said for it and poses a formidable challenge to 
those of us who believe in the possibility of just wars.”).  
10 As Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter expressed in the 1992 Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
decision, liberty itself, apart from any free exercise analysis, is broadly understood to protect one’s concept 
of meaning and existence.  505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).  “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”  Id. 
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II. WHY IS ACCOMMODATION DIFFICULT? 
¶11 Returning to the introductory question—why accommodate?—helps to explain the 
difficulty of creating accommodations for the competing positions on this issue, 
particularly for gay marriage advocates to tolerate the idea of substantial religious 
accommodations.  
¶12 Technically, of course, gay marriage does not raise religious liberty issues, but 
instead is best understood as a church-state conflict.  There is no genuinely “neutral” 
position for the state with regard to marriage.  As long as marriage retains a legal status, 
the law must have some core conception of what marriage is; it cannot leave the 
definition to individuals or other groups.   
¶13 Given this reality—that marriage laws will include some and exclude other at least 
potentially competing visions of marriage—technical and academic legal prowess alone 
cannot help us name, much less answer, the primary question to drafting accommodation 
legislation for people and faith communities that do not see same-sex unions as 
marriages: why should we accommodate religious views at all? 
¶14 Gay marriage advocates have crafted a public argument that presumes there is no 
possible good reason to oppose gay marriage.  According to some gay marriage 
advocates, only animus and hatred explains why, after an appropriate time to get used to 
the idea, any American would seriously object to gay marriage.11  But we do not draft 
legislative accommodations for irrational hatred.  
¶15 Before I continue this line of thought, let me start by stating the obvious: I am not a 
legal scholar, and in this Article I am not going to play one.  The intellectual contribution 
that I hope to make to this debate is not that of a detached observer whose expertise is in 
legal codes, but as an active participant in the gay marriage civil discourse (and from the 
side perhaps least well-represented among law professors, those who oppose gay 
marriage).   
¶16 Yet, let me admit something else: on the question of gay rights, I was for many 
years not a participant on any side.  I was a watchful bystander.  Like many Americans, I 
was ambivalent, moved by compassion and civility, held back by a certain apprehension 
about where a social change this rapid was headed.  For better or for worse, I simply did 
not involve myself in the epic battles around gay rights that unfolded around me, on one 
side or the other.  
¶17 However, I began to watch these battles more closely.  Marriage, sex, and the 
family were my principal concerns, and thus I remember the public arguments, especially 
the sound bites most often repeated in the press.12  I remember the public arguments that 
kept me a bystander, sympathetic, silent, and yet also nervous.  
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Michael B. Farrell, Prop 8 Trial: Did Animosity Drive California’s Gay Marriage Ban, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 13, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2010/0113/Prop.-8-trial-
Did-animosity-drive-California-s-gay-marriage-ban (reporting attorney Ted Olson’s argument that 
“Proposition 8, and the irrational pattern of California’s regulation of marriage which it promulgates, 
advances no legitimate state interest.  All it does is label gay and lesbian persons as different, inferior, 
unequal, and disfavored.”). 
12 See Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, Constitutional and Legal Defects in the “Defense of 
Marriage” Act, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 221 (1996) (promoting the idea that marriage is bigotry); Mark 
Strasser, Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Antimiscegenation Analogy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 981 (1991) (promoting a racial analogy). 
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¶18 The arguments for gay rights generally were (before the gay marriage debate), I 
suspect, rather deliberately framed in ways that kept me, and people like me, a bystander.  
Even as the debate began to shift toward same-sex marriage, the presentation of these 
arguments was clearly designed to minimize the scope of the changes being 
institutionalized in law, partially or wholly to forestall public opposition.13  
Incrementalism was the watchword of the day.14   
¶19 I remember these arguments because I remember the way in which they 
successfully kept me on the sidelines, out of this culture war, until marriage became the 
defining issue.  
¶20 From my limited perch, I see certain truths about the way in which gay rights and 
gay marriage and religious liberties are likely to conflict.  And I can perhaps attempt also 
to explain the intensity of the current fears around the conflict experienced by supporters 
of marriage traditions, especially religious people and communities.  I offer these not in 
the spirit of a complaint, but in the spirit of genuine dialogue, which begins by trying to 
make the way the world looks visible across diverging intellectual, political, and moral 
lines. 
¶21 Here’s the first insight I can offer: gay marriage advocates and sympathetic cultural 
elites feel more confident that the new line between gay rights and the rights of dissenters 
(between competing visions of equality and freedom) will be drawn in a reasonable place, 
because they feel in charge of drawing the line.15  Traditional religious believers do not, 
                                                 
13 See Andrew Sullivan, Why the M Word Matters to Me, TIME, Feb. 8, 2004, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101040216-588877,00.html (linking gay marriage to 
personal feelings about acceptance by society); Carol Ness, Straights Join Movement for Gay Marriage, 
S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 12, 1999, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/e/a/1999/02/12/NEWS7171.dtl (arguing that the marriage debate is about the value of gay 
persons); Evan Wolfson, Exclusion from Marriage: Historical Parallels (Dec. 1999), 
http://www.buddybuddy.com/wolfso02.html (arguing that opposition to redefining marriage is analogous to 
opposing interracial marriage). 
14 Incrementalism has been a tactical decision of many prominent gay marriage activists, recommended as a 
means of minimizing opposition and backlash.  See DANIEL CERE, INST. FOR AMERICAN. VALUES, THE 
FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW: LAW AND THE MARRIAGE CRISIS IN NORTH AMERICA 11–12 (2005), available at 
http://www.marriagedebate.com/pdf/future_of_family_law.pdf (“Make no mistake: incremental changes do 
not mean unimportant changes. William Eskridge explains the tactical advantages of advocating only 
incremental changes to the law.  Though he supports same-sex marriage, for strategic reasons, he advises 
against any direct push for legal redefinition of marriage.  He writes that a main benefit of incrementalism 
is that it leaves resulting changes largely immune from direct public criticism and debate.”); see also 
THOMAS M. MESSNER, HERITAGE FOUND., ENDA AND THE PATH TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2009), 
available at http://www.heritage.org/research/religion/bg2317.cfm# (compiling additional statements of 
same-sex marriage supporters advocating an incremental approach to the issue); Kees Waaldijk, Small 
Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the Netherlands, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF 
SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 437 (Robert 
Wintemute & Mads Andenaes eds., 2001) (advocating “the law of small change” as a strategy to same-sex 
marriage); Evan Wolfson, Marriage and Gays: What Would Lincoln Do?, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 11, 
2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/evan-wolfson/marriage-and-gays-what-wo_b_165761.html 
(suggesting the Lincolnian approach would couple moral clarity with incremental action); E.J. Graff, 
California Leads on Civil Unions, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 29, 2003, at A11 (“Legislatures in Connecticut 
and Rhode Island have, for the past few years, been considering something similar to the California 
approach. Same-sex marriage activists there, take note: Much can be accomplished incrementally, as 
legislators and citizens see that fairness won’t bring on locusts, boils, plague, et al.”). 
15 This is not to say that they are necessarily in charge of drawing the lines on the definition of marriage, 
only that they are in charge of drawing the lines between what they will consider bigotry or homophobia 
and reasonable disagreement. 
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because they are not in charge of the line and the line keeps shifting with head-spinning 
rapidity. 
¶22 When I was a young adult, in the late 1980s, compassion for AIDS victims was top 
priority,16 and a capacity to separate orientation from behavior was the line between good 
citizenship and bigotry.  Being gay was not a choice.  Therefore being gay could not be 
the ground for moral condemnation.  A “good” Catholic could be gay, provided he 
accepted the teachings of his or her church in regards to sexual practice.17  Therefore 
sexual orientation per se could not reasonably be used to judge a person, but sexual 
behavior (a voluntary act) was still subject to moral critique. 
¶23 At this time, not long ago, Cardinal O’Connor of New York could be deemed a 
hero for washing the feet of AIDS victims and expanding Church services to help fill this 
need.18  Additionally, when the Catholic Church’s catechism condemned “unjust 
                                                 
16 As the Administrative Board of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops wrote at the time:  
[W]e are alarmed by the increase of negative attitudes as well as acts of violence directed against 
gay and lesbian people since AIDS has become a national issue.  We strongly condemn such 
violence.  Those who are gay or lesbian or suffering from AIDS should not be the objects of 
discrimination, injustice, or violence.  All of God's sons and daughters, all members of our 
society, are entitled to the recognition of their full human dignity.  
U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE ADMIN. BD., PUBL’N NO. 195.4, THE MANY FACES OF AIDS: A GOSPEL 
RESPONSE (Nov. 14, 1987), available at http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/international/mfa87.shtml. 
17 Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons (Oct. 1, 1986), 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19861001_homose
xual-persons_en.html (“The intrinsic dignity of each person must always be respected in word, in action 
and in law. . . .  It has been argued that the homosexual orientation in certain cases is not the result of 
deliberate choice; and so the homosexual person would then have no choice but to behave in a homosexual 
fashion.  Lacking freedom, such a person, even if engaged in homosexual activity, would not be culpable     
. . . .  What is at all costs to be avoided is the unfounded and demeaning assumption that the sexual 
behavior of homosexual persons is always and totally compulsive and therefore inculpable.  What is 
essential is that the fundamental liberty which characterizes the human person and gives him his dignity be 
recognized as belonging to the homosexual person as well.”). 
18 See Felicia R. Lee, At a Catholic Health Center, a Haven for AIDS Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1989, 
at B1:  
 “The biggest priority is dealing with AIDS in the diocese” [sic] said Msgr. James T. Cassidy, 
the director of health and hospitals for the archdiocese. . . .  
 The monsignor said he saw no contradiction between the church's commitment to AIDS 
patients and its opposition to homosexuality.  Many victims of AIDS are homosexual men, and 
anal intercourse and intravenous drug use are two common ways the virus is transmitted.  
 “I think what we're saying is we're not interested in what a person's problem is, but their 
sickness,” he said.  “We are against homosexual acts, but God says love the sinner, hate the sin. 
We felt the need was there.” . . . The unit receives 10 applications for every one of its 44 beds, 
which are to be increased to 58 beds in October.  A team of medical personnel and social 
workers from the hospital goes to every hospital in the city, interviewing patients who fit the 
medical and social criteria for admission. 
 Eight women and 36 men are now living in the AIDS unit.  About 35 of them were 
intravenous drug users, and many are without friends, family or a home.  Since the unit opened, 
13 patients have died, but two were released to nursing homes after their symptoms were 
alleviated. 
 Almost all the patients are very thin, some to the point of emaciation. One man is blind, and 
several use wheelchairs.  Most have some degree of mental impairment. 
 The patients receive intensive medical care, which can include blood transfusions and a 
myriad of daily drugs and procedures.  And they say they are grateful for the dignity they are 
given.  “They Treat You Well” [sic] 
 “It's mainly what the hospital stirs up inside me,” said Murray, who is 48 and used heroin 
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discrimination” against homosexuals—even as it reaffirmed the Church’s traditional 
teaching that sex is appropriate only in a marital union of husband and wife—it received 
mainstream plaudits.19  
¶24 The distinction between orientation and behavior, held to be a key distinction only 
a few years ago, has now collapsed, rejected by gay rights advocates.  The 
status/behavior distinction is no longer operative today.  If it is okay to be gay, then it 
must also be okay to have gay sex.  As Chai Feldblum, one of the more generous 
theorists of gay rights points out, “What do they think being gay means?”20 
¶25 Even five years ago, to give another example of rapidly shifting lines, support for 
civil unions immunized a believer or moralist from the charge of bigotry or hatred against 
gay people:21 While those who opposed all gay legal unions were haters, those who at 
least supported civil unions were still viewed by mainstream gay marriage advocates as 
within the scope of civility and good citizenship.22   
¶26 In 2009, with the battle over California’s Proposition 8, a measure that both 
overturned gay marriage and yet maintained civil unions, the line between decency and 
bigotry was once again abruptly re-drawn.  Donors, voters, and advocates who oppose 
gay marriage were treated just as much as haters and bigots if they supported civil unions 
as if they did not.23  
¶27 My point is not to critique these shifting positions as right or wrong, but to note this 
political, social, and psychological fact: from the standpoint of traditional religious 
believers who are opposed to gay marriage, rapidly shifting dividing lines create 
immense uncertainty about where the line between decency and discrimination will next 
be drawn in the public square.   
                                                                                                                                                 
and cocaine for 25 years.  He, like other patients, asked that they be identified only by their first 
names.  He used to share needles, and he believes that is how he contracted AIDS.  “We have a 
little bingo on Tuesdays, movies.  They treat you well.”  
19 Perhaps nowhere was the catechism’s injunction to treat gays and lesbians with dignity, while at the same 
time upholding the teachings of the Church regarding sexual ethics, lived out more publicly and 
consistently than by John Cardinal O’Connor.  While many gay activists decried Cardinal O’Connor’s 
consistent opposition to legislation seen as endorsing homosexual conduct, many respected his gracious 
care, especially for those suffering from AIDS.  See Richard Levine, Koch, in Book with O’Connor, Traces 
Conservative Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1989, at A1: 
Mr. Koch defends his administration’s decision, over the Cardinal’s objection, to promote the 
use of condoms and distribute free needles to drug addicts to help prevent the spread of AIDS.  
But the Mayor praises the role of the Catholic Church in treating AIDS patients and disparages 
criticism of Cardinal O’Connor by gay rights groups.  “John Cardinal O’Connor is a friend, an 
invaluable ally for those of us concerned about AIDS,” Mr. Koch writes.  “Controversies may 
rise between us, but a common bond will always unite us.” 
20 Chai Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 61, 104 
(2006). 
21 Andrew Sullivan, The Right Call, THE DAILY DISH, July 10, 2006, 
http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2006/07/the_right_call.html (“Fair-minded people can 
agree to disagree on support for marriage or civil unions. But denying gay couples any civil protections is 
on its face hateful.”). 
22 See, e.g., Frank Rich, The Bigots’ Last Hurrah, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2009, at WK 10, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/19/opinion/19Rich.html?_r=1 (lauding Utah governor Jon Huntsman for 
supporting civil unions and distinguishing him from “bigots” who oppose same-sex marriage); see also 
Stuart Taylor, Gay Marriage by Judicial Decree, NATIONAL JOURNAL, May 24, 2008, 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/or_20080524_4694.php. 
23 THOMAS M. MESSNER, HERITAGE FOUND., THE PRICE OF PROP 8 (2009), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/bg2328.cfm. 
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¶28 Those who support gay marriage appear confident and serene about where that line 
will be drawn, primarily because they are likely to be in charge of dictating where it will 
be drawn: between so-called acceptable ideas and those seen as grounded in irrational 
hatred, a.k.a. bigotry.24 
¶29 To advocates of the traditional understanding of marriage, which includes the vast 
majority of America’s major faith traditions and a majority of American voters, recent 
experience is far more disturbing, fluid, and uncertain.  What has happened already, 
which perhaps understandably seems minor to gay marriage advocates, is already deeply 
disturbing and unexpected.   
¶30 For instance, I never expected to live in an America where a state would not permit 
a Catholic adoption agency to place children up for adoption unless they were also 
willing to place children with same-sex couples,25 or where a city council would vote for 
a resolution urging a Catholic bishop and ordinary Catholics to defy their faith as “un-
American.”26  In the larger scale of human history, one may believe that these are small 
things.  The sky has not fallen, so to speak.  However, there is a large, jagged crack in the 
ceiling of our culture that appears to increasingly demand one to choose between one’s 
faith and one’s citizenship. 
¶31 The conflict between religious liberty and state power in Europe and Canada on 
this issue is shocking to the American conscience, and yet the sky is not falling there.  
Grotesque government intrusions of religious liberty in the name of equality are treated 
as normal, and even celebrated as gay rights advances.27 
¶32 This cultural process of redefining traditional views on sexual morality as 
illegitimate bigotry does not only affect how society views gay people, it also affects 
what might be called respect the for “the natural family.”  In 2003, when I first entered 
the marriage debate, I said, “[t]he ideal for a child is a mother and father, and marriage 
                                                 
24 See Shannon Gilreath, Not a Moral Issue: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, 2010 ILL. L. REV. 
205 (2010); Marci Hamilton, Religious Liberty, Same-Sex Marriage, and the Coming Pressure on 
Legislatures to Reach An Appropriate Permissive Accommodation of Religious Entities That Discriminate 
Against Gay Couples (Nov. 1, 2007), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20071101.html.  For a gay 
marriage supporter who is more sympathetic to the liberty concerns of traditional believers, see Eugene 
Volokh, Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101 (2006), and ANDREW 
KOPPELMAN & GEORGE W. DENT, MUST GAY RIGHTS CONFLICT WITH RELIGIOUS LIBERTY? (forthcoming 
2010). 
25 See Maggie Gallagher, Banned in Boston, WEEKLY STANDARD, May 15, 2006, at 20; John Garvey, State 
Putting Church Out of Adoption Business, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 2006, at A15 (describing the decision 
of the state not to accommodate the organization’s desire to continue placing children for adoption but not 
placing them with same-sex couples). 
26 See Rachel Gordon, Supervisors Slam Vatican on Adoptions, S.F. CHRONICLE, Mar. 22, 2006, at B3. 
27 See Heintz v. Christian Horizons, [2008] 2008 H.R.T.O. 22 (Can.), available at 
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onhrt/doc/2008/2008hrto22/2008hrto22.pdf (holding Christian residential 
center cannot require employees to comply with moral code); Reaney v. Hereford Diocesan Bd. of Fin., 
No. 1602844/2006 (Employment Trib. of Cardiff July 17, 2007), available at 
http://thinkinganglicans.org.uk/uploads/herefordtribunaljudgment.html (holding Anglican Bishop cannot 
dismiss youth minister in a same-sex relationship); QUE. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, QUEBEC POLICY AGAINST 
HOMOPHOBIA (Dec. 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gouv.qc.ca/english/publications/rapports/pdf/homophobie-a.pdf (setting forth strong 
new policy to combat what the government believes to be homophobia, including in non-public settings); 
Sarah Lyall, Who is a Jew? Court Ruling in Britain Raises Question, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2009, at A8, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/08/world/europe/08britain.html (discussing a British ruling 
that a Jewish school cannot exclude non-Jews from enrollment); Laurie Goodstein, A Line in the Sand for 
Same-Sex Marriage Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2008, at A12 (describing religious liberty conflicts).  
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exists to further this ideal.”28  Gay marriage advocates mostly responded that gay 
marriage would not change that ideal: “Gay marriage would have no consequences for 
you,” I was most often told.29 
¶33 Yet by September of 2009, just a few years down this road, I did a Maine radio 
interview in which I said, “[m]arriage is not discrimination because unions of husband 
and wife really are special.  These are the only kind of unions that can make new life and 
connect those children in love to their mother and father.”  Instantly, the host responded, 
“I can’t believe I’m hearing such bigotry!”30 
¶34 Indeed, in Maine, though the majority of local voters disagreed, gay marriage 
advocates felt confident enough in their position that they went after the social work 
license of a high school counselor after she appeared in a TV ad opposing same-sex 
marriage.31  Conversely, a teacher who appeared in a pro-gay marriage ad faced no such 
threat to her livelihood.32  I never expected to live in an America where individuals could 
be threatened with a loss of their livelihood for expressing their position on marriage 
laws. 
¶35 There exist many other instances of apparent deception (or perhaps, more 
charitably, rapid “incrementalism”) by gay marriage advocates.  For instance, in 2005, 
gay rights advocates succeeded in passing a civil union law in Connecticut,33 publicly 
promising it was not about gay marriage.34  But the next day gay marriage advocates 
turned around in court and used the existence of a civil union law to persuade the 
Connecticut Supreme Court that the state’s marriage laws were discriminatory.35 
                                                 
28 Maggie Gallagher, The Stakes, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, July 14, 2003, 
http://article.nationalreview.com/269352/the-stakes/maggie-gallagher. 
29 See Steve Chapman, An Odd Silence on Gay Marriage, REASON.COM, Aug. 20, 2009, 
http://reason.com/archives/2009/08/20/an-odd-silence-on-gay-marriage. 
30 NOM News Digest, http://opine-editorials.blogspot.com/2009/09/nom-news-digest.html (Sept. 2009) 
(reporting on an appearance by Maggie Gallagher on The Ken and Mike Morning News Show, 560 WGAN, 
on September 4, 2009, available at http://podcast.560wgan.com/wgan/1937751.mp3).  
 The initial attacks on Carrie Prejean, including the comment by a pageant official that “I am personally   
. . . hurt that Miss California believes marriage rights belong only to a man and a woman,” also reflect this 
view that opposition to gay marriage itself, however innocently and civilly expressed, is hateful bigotry.  
See Carrie Prejean Says Answer to Gay Marriage Question Cost Her Miss USA Crown, FOX NEWS, Apr. 
20, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/2009/04/20/carrie-prejean-says-answer-gay-marriage-
question-cost-miss-usa-crown/.  
 Obviously, it is surprising to hear the cross-cultural and, until very recently, almost universally accepted 
idea that marriage is the union of a man and a woman (because that type of relationship alone can produce 
children without third party intervention) characterized as bigotry.  Advocates of so-called “traditional” 
marriage do not see bigotry; they see what is, to them, an obvious reflection of a natural reality. 
31 See Maine Counselor’s Career Threatened for Support for Marriage (Oct. 30, 2009), 
http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/news/story.aspx?cid=5112. 
32 Id. 
33 An Act Concerning Civil Unions, Conn. Pub. Act No. 05-10 (2005). 
34 Connecticut OKs Civil Unions for Gay Couples, MSNBC.COM, Apr. 20, 2005, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7579226/. 
35 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 416 (Conn. 2008).  
 Similarly, when gay adoption was institutionalized, advocates in public seldom made an argument for 
equality.  They did not tell the general public that the reason we should permit gay adoption is because our 
ideal of marriage and the natural family was bigoted and discriminatory, or that all family forms are the 
same.  Indeed, they did not say kids were no better off with a mom and dad than a gay man.  Rather, more 
typically, they said children were better off with a gay man as a parent, than no parent at all.  As Matthew 
Coles, Director of the ACLU’s Lesbian and Gay Rights Project and attorney representing the plaintiff’s in 
Florida’s gay adoption case, told the New York Times in 2001, “I wouldn’t argue that married parents are 
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¶36 I am walking through these anecdotes and incidents not to try to set up a contest in 
which the comparatively modest legal pressures currently aimed at religious believers are 
set against the history of gay people in this country.  This Article is not a complaint; it is 
an honest attempt to contribute to this discourse by making visible to gay marriage 
advocates why so many who oppose gay marriage are convinced that gay marriage is 
going to have serious consequences down the road36—for themselves, their families, and 
their faith communities, including religious schools, charities, and ministries.   
¶37 These consequences are not something we see happening in the remote and 
uncertain future.  They are visibly happening now.  We now live in an America in which 
to speak (and especially to act) for the idea that “to make a marriage you need a husband 
and wife” will in itself provoke charges of hatred, bigotry, and discrimination.  The 
end—if we do not stand our ground—is not at all clear to us.   
¶38 Those who publicly note these concerns are not scaremongering.  They are scared 
by the logical implications of reframing the marriage debate to cast those who believe 
marriage requires a man and a woman as hateful bigots whose beliefs must be suppressed 
by operation of law. 
¶39 Why does gay marriage now pose a credible threat to religious liberty in the minds 
of opponents?  First, marriage represents the “hardest case” for gay rights advocates.  If 
the idea that there is no difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couplings can be 
used to overturn our marriage traditions, then there is clearly no place in American 
society where drawing any distinctions can be appropriate.  If “children need moms and 
dads” is bigotry, any objection to homosexual conduct, or preference for the natural 
family, is bigotry. 
¶40 Moreover, marriage is a public act, so it makes latent conflicts in orientation 
discrimination laws manifest.  This is what happened in the Massachusetts Catholic 
Charities situation, where the local Catholic Church realized its previous “don’t ask, 
don’t tell” fudging around the lines would no longer work.37  Publicly married gay 
couples would show up and ask for children.  The Church would either be forced to place 
these children with gay married couples in public opposition to its principles on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, or face criminal and civil penalties.38 
                                                                                                                                                 
not in a child’s best interest . . . .  But that’s not the choice for these kids.  With 3,400 kids in foster care in 
Florida waiting for adoption, the choice for these kids is a home with gay people or no real home at all.” 
Tamar Lewin, Court Backs Florida Ban on Adoption By Gays, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2001, at A14.   
 Only once gay adoption was institutionalized by law was it used in court to suggest that the ancient 
deeply embedded idea in our legal history that marriage was about bringing together the child’s natural 
parents where possible was, well, no longer operative or sustainable.  See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003) (looking to Massachusetts law on same-sex adoption in 
concluding that because “the Commonwealth affirmatively facilitates bringing children into a family 
regardless of whether . . . the parent or her partner is heterosexual, homosexual or bisexual,” “[r]estricting 
marriage to opposite-sex couples . . . cannot plausibly further [the State’s interest in protecting the welfare 
of children].”) 
36 Some of these consequences are noted throughout this Article, such as incursions on religious liberty and 
the endorsement of a message that children do not need a mother and father. 
37 See Daniel Avila, Same-Sex Adoption in Massachusetts, the Catholic Church, and the Good of the 
Children: The Story Behind the Controversy and the Case for Conscientious Refusals, 27 CHILD. LEGAL 
RTS. J. 1 (2007). 
38 See Roger Severino, Or for Poorer? How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Religious Liberty, 30 HARV. J. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 939, 975 (2007); Garvey, supra note 25. 
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¶41 In Washington D.C., the Catholic Church asked the D.C. City Council for religious 
liberty protections that would permit Catholic Charities (a highly-regarded adoption and 
foster care social service in a locale where, unfortunately, corruption and incompetence 
are all too common in the provision of government services39) to continue to help 
abandoned and abused children.40  The response of the D.C. City Council was once again 
telling: “They don’t represent, in my mind, an indispensable component of our social 
services infrastructure.”41 
¶42 Orientation laws, including gay marriage laws, are posing a new threat to religious 
liberty, and liberty of conscience generally, because they are being dramatically 
reinterpreted from the time of their original inception to include both an equality right to 
be and a liberty right to do, as Chai Feldblum put it.42   
¶43 This new conception is an equality right on steroids; the right being asserted is not 
only to live as one chooses, but to be protected from knowledge of civil and moral 
disagreement with the choices one has made in everyday life, in the interests of 
advancing equality.   
¶44 Liberty arguments lead to pluralism, which requires us to tolerate those with whom 
we disagree and affirm their core rights.  Equality arguments lead to the expansion of 
state power to repress and marginalize anti-equality bigots.  The fusion of liberty and 
equality rights in the gay rights debates represents the biggest intellectual and conceptual 
challenge to finding a path to pluralism.  
¶45 This is a problem for traditional faith communities, but it is also at the heart of the 
difficulties gay marriage advocates have had in endorsing religious liberty protections.  
¶46 In the medium term, overcoming the threat posed to religious liberty will require 
not only substantive accommodation but at least some modest conceptual 
disentanglement of the equality and the liberty interest implicit in the idea of gay rights.   
¶47 Traditional religious believers will have to accept that they live among people who 
view gay sex (and gay marriage) as a good—and should be required to respect the rights 
of those who disagree, including basic norms of civility.  But they should not be asked to 
endorse that belief themselves as a condition of good citizenship as individuals or in and 
through their associations and organizations.  
¶48 Let me be clear: I am not saying that gay rights include the right to be but not the 
right to do.  I believe that gay rights are a liberty interest and that they include the right to 
                                                 
39 See Vernon Loeb, Barry Brings Halt to Turbulent D.C. Saga, WASH. POST, May 22, 1998, at A1, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local/longterm/library/dc/barry/barryyears0522a.htm. 
40 Tim Craig, Michelle Boorstein, & Carol Morello, D.C. Council Digs in on Same-Sex Nuptials, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 13, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/11/12/AR2009111210789.html. 
41 Tim Craig & Michelle Boorstein, Catholic Church Gives D.C. Ultimatum, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/11/AR2009111116943.html (quoting 
Councilmember David Catania). 
42 Feldblum, supra note 20, at 104 (“In the legal arena, this approach to a gay person’s identity and being 
has been framed as the ‘status/conduct’ distinction. . . .  From the moment I became aware of this legal 
approach, I have detested it and argued against it.  It seemed to me the height of disingenuousness, 
absurdity and indeed disrespect, to tell someone it is permissible to ‘be’ gay, but not permissible to engage 
in gay sex.  What do they think being gay means?”); see also id. at 120 (“Just as we do not tolerate private 
racial beliefs that adversely affect African-Americans in the commercial arena, even if such beliefs are 
based on religious views, we should similarly not tolerate private beliefs about sexual orientation and 
gender identity that adversely affect LGBT people.”). 
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do: the right of gay people to live as they choose, to express affection, to be who they are 
in public unmolested by harassment, to visit each other in hospital rooms, etc.  
¶49 The law in my view must intervene to protect the legitimate liberty interests of gay 
people.43  But if gay rights are understood as a liberty interest, rather than an equality 
interest, then gay people do not have the right to be protected from the knowledge that 
many people have a different way of organizing, understanding, conceptualizing, and 
therefore acting upon their sexual impulses, both gay, straight, in between, or something 
else.44 
¶50 I understand that it is quite possible that most people, in the postmodern context, 
may well conclude upon reflection that a persistent sexual desire between consenting 
adults that hurts no third party is either a moral good, or at least a morally neutral act.  
But there are other ways of thinking about, conceptualizing, and enacting the meaning of 
human bodies and human desires, of defining the sexual good that ought to be protected 
and respected legally and culturally.45 
¶51 Why?  The gap between desire and action is a gap that demands reflection, which 
means and includes the possibility of moral critique and moral disagreement.  Here is 
another way in which sexual liberty and religious liberty share certain common premises. 
¶52 American civic culture insists on the full citizenship of all religions, but it never 
requires the religious believer to surrender his or her truth claims about other religions as 
the price of gaining that liberty.  If respect for conscience drives our respect for religious 
difference, that very respect presumptively includes the right and duty to critique each 
other’s consciences, not to be free from painful or upsetting controversy about the nature 
of God, the purpose of life, or the content of the moral good.   
¶53 At the same time, religious liberty has spawned a civic culture and etiquette that 
includes recognizing that the time, place, and manner of such critiques should be 
restrained and channeled by civic respect for our mutual rights as citizens.  This etiquette 
is not primarily a matter of law but of the culture of mutual civic respect that religious 
liberty has fostered in the public square.  We are free to criticize the truth claims of each 
other’s religions, but not in a context that calls each other’s rights, liberties, or good 
citizenship into question. 
¶54 I would go further: each one of us (including gay people) has a human right to live 
in a society that not only grudgingly permits but encourages moral reflection about sexual 
behavior.  A sexual desire cannot be its own justification.  To take the alternative 
“equality” position (that a desire should not be open to critique, because too much of 
one’s personhood is at stake) is to dehumanize all of us as nothing more than sexual 
beings.  To take the position that one was born with sexual desire, cannot control sexual 
desire, and therefore must have this desire treated as akin to skin color or gender, is 
                                                 
43 The question of gay marriage, in my view, cannot be settled on that ground, for reasons I will not go into 
here, but see Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution: A 
Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 33 (2004).  
44 See David France, The Science of Gaydar, N.Y. MAG., June 17, 2007, 
http://nymag.com/news/features/33520/ (describing the variety of understanding of sexuality).   
45 See GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS, VOLUME 2: LIVING A CHRISTIAN LIFE ch. 9 (1993); 
DAVID GREENBERG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1990); STANLEY JAMES GRENZ, SEXUAL 
ETHICS: AN EVANGELICAL PERSPECTIVE (1990); Catechism of the Catholic Church: The Sacrament of 
Matrimony, http://www.vatican.va/archive/catechism/p2s2c3a7.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2010); Southern 
Baptist Convention, The Baptist Faith and Message § XVIII, http://www.sbc.net/BFM/bfm2000.asp (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
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ultimately dehumanizing, for all people, including gay people.  Free adults should not ask 
to be protected from the knowledge that rational people disagree about appropriate sexual 
behavior, no matter how painful they may find it. 
¶55 To repeat myself: many, perhaps most, Americans may adopt the view that 
unchosen sexual desires (a.k.a., “orientations”) that do not hurt third parties are morally 
justified.  But that latter additional step—sexual desire is unchosen and therefore sexual 
behavior is justified—must still be taken in a way that respects, permits, and encourages 
moral reflection about sexual acts.  The race analogy conceptually fails in sexual 
behavior discussions.  Skin color does not give rise to a morality.46  Sexual behavior—
because it is behavior—necessarily does.  
¶56 And so some others—perhaps few or perhaps many—will remain attached, for 
religious and other reasons, to the great enduring principles that animated and 
undergirded our civilization for generations.  These principles produced, for better and 
for worse, not only our law, but our art, our history, and our ethical reflections including 
these moral truths (no longer self-evident but still compelling): the bodies of human 
beings, male and female, are not mere instruments to be bent to our personal desires and 
wills.  They have an objective meaning and purpose that is larger than satisfying our 
desires and appetites.   
¶57 Many of us will hold these truths, even when they are no longer self-evident: men 
and women are made for each other, and sexual desire is intended by nature as well as by 
nature’s God to pull men and women together into families in which the co-creators of 
the child will love and care for the child.  Sexual desire is morally intended therefore to 
pull the sexes into service not only to each other but to the great cause of cooperating in 
the creation of life.47 
¶58 I submit the resistance of the American people to the idea of gay marriage is 
grounded, as Stanford Law Professor Richard Thompson Ford wrote in 2006, in an 
understanding of gender and its part in the experience of the meaning of our embodiment:  
How to reconcile the growing support for equal rights for gay Americans 
with the seemingly hardening opposition to gay marriage?  It certainly 
suggests that homophobia is only part of the explanation for the 
widespread resistance to same-sex marriage.  A lot of the resistance is less 
about sexual orientation than about sex difference.  In other words, it’s not 
about the difference between gay and straight; it’s about the difference 
between male and female.  By this logic, conventional marriage doesn’t 
exclude gay couples from a special status reserved for straights; it 
excludes women from a special status reserved for men—that of 
                                                 
46 No one would argue, for instance, that having a certain color of skin is right or wrong.  Many people, 
however, believe, and act on the belief, that certain choices are right or wrong.  Almost everyone would 
agree if the subject were non-consensual sexual relations.  Would a discussion of non-consensual skin color 
even make sense? 
47 For example, “‘God is love and in himself he lives a mystery of personal loving communion.  Creating 
the human race in his own image, God inscribed in the humanity of man and woman the vocation, and thus 
the capacity and responsibility, of love and communion.’ ‘God created man in his own image . . . male and 
female he created them;’ He blessed them and said “Be fruitful and multiply.” . . . Physical, moral and 
spiritual difference and complementarity are oriented toward the good of marriage and the flourishing of 
family life.”  CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 560 (2d ed. 2009).  See BLANKENHORN, supra note 3, 
for a discussion of cross-cultural evidence of the prevalence of similar basic beliefs about marriage.   
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husband—and excludes men from a status reserved for women—that of 
wife.48 
¶59 Even people who do not enter into a conventional marriage, who never produce 
children with their acts of love, who may not even have sex, or who are not even attracted 
to the opposite sex, may decide, upon reflection, to commit their life to principles of 
organizing human sexuality upon other principles than those espoused by gay marriage 
advocates.  I know this because I have met these people.49  Our philosophy and 
jurisprudence must be big enough to include these human possibilities, if we are to do 
justice.  
¶60 A free society cannot be frozen by today.  We have to hold out for possibilities yet 
undreamt of in our contemporary essentialist philosophizing about orientation.  Even if 
those of us who believe in the conclusion that gay sex is good or morally neutral, cannot 
therefore deny the reality of the process of moral reflection, which includes the necessity 
of considering possible critiques.  
¶61 Here is the strongest form of my argument: disagreement about the nature, 
meaning, and purpose of human sexuality cannot be redefined as bigotry without doing a 
profound injustice to all our human rights, including to advocates of gay rights.  
Understanding gay rights as an equality right collapses this key distinction between 
bigotry and good faith disagreement, in a way that will make it easier to use the law to 
protect gay people from a daily awareness of the reality that many people in society 
morally disapprove of sexual acts between two men or two women.50  
¶62 Gay people who have concluded that gay sex is good deserve to live in a society 
where that decision is respected and understood as the result of a moral reflection, not 
policed by government and law as if it were a characteristic over which human beings 
have no control.51  Conscience protections to same-sex marriage and orientation 
discrimination laws ultimately serve the human rights of all.  
¶63 But this will happen only if—and this is a great “if”—we can recognize the case for 
opposition to gay sexuality and to gay marriage as having roots in something other than 
mere hatred.  That is our task, however improbable.  That is the pathway to an American 
solution. 
                                                 
48 Richard Thompson Ford, Hate and Marriage: Same-Sex Marriage Setbacks May Not Be All Bad News 
for Gay Rights, SLATE, July 12, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2145620/.  
49 See Mark Oppenheimer, A Gay Catholic Voice Against Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2010, at 
A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/05/us/05beliefs.html.  David Benkof, an openly gay 
Orthodox Jew, is another such example.  See David Benkof, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Benkof 
(last visited Sept. 14, 2010). 
50 Lydia Saad, Americans Evenly Divided on Morality of Homosexuality, GALLUP, June 18, 2008, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/108115/Americans-Evenly-Divided-Morality-Homosexuality.aspx. 
51 For an example of the latter argument, see Dean Hamer & Michael Rosbash, Genetics and Proposition 8, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/23/opinion/la-oe-rosbash23-2010feb23. 
There are also biological explanations of many human choices and characteristics, including religion, as Dr. 
Hamer’s work suggests.  See DEAN HAMER, THE GOD GENE: HOW FAITH IS HARDWIRED INTO OUR GENES 7 
(2004).  There is undoubtedly a biological substrata to many sexual inclinations, as well as to other 
inclinations, from owning dogs to consuming alcohol.  We live in bodies, our bodies influence our minds, 
but this isn’t an answer to the need for moral reflection about acts to which we are strongly genetically 
predisposed. 
